Barry Fisher's Employment Law Blog

In Donald v. Metepenagiag Mi’kmaq Nation ( 2016 NBQB 220 ) Justice McNally was faced with the situation of a school principal being terminated allegedly for just cause, however the termination letter gave no reasons for the dismissal. The reasons only came out later in the Statement of Defence.

After reviewing various authorities, the Judge had this to say about the procedural requirement of proving just cause:

27 As I read the authorities, the first step in the analysis of the merits of an action for unjust dismissal is a determination of the reasons communicated by the employer to the employee for the dismissal, followed by a determination of whether those reasons have been proven on the balance of probabilities and finally a determination of whether the facts as proven constitute a repudiation of an essential condition of the employment contract or a fundamental breach of the employment contract by the employee in the particular circumstances and context of the case and the employment relationship — see also McKinley v. BC Tel, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.).

This paragraph sets out three distinct aspects for the employer to prove if they intend to rely on just cause :

1) Setting out the just cause in the termination letter.

2) Proving the facts supporting the cause.

3) Showing that the breach was serious enough to justify dismissal.

In respect to the first ground the Judge had the following to say :

28 With regards to the first step of the analysis in the instant case, the letter of termination presented to Mr. Donald on June 24, 2009 does not articulate the reasons for his dismissal, neither on its face nor by implication by incorporation of the content of the letter provided to him on February 8, 2010 which was apparently attached to the letter of termination. No evidence was presented to establish that the Band provided any more particulars verbally to Mr. Donald for the reason for his termination. No witness with direct knowledge was presented at trial by the Band to articulate the particular reasons for Mr. Donald’s termination. The defendant called two witnesses at trial, Ms. Ward and Karen Augustine, one of the Co-Managers and the author of the letter of concerns of February 8, 2010 to Mr. Donald. Ms. Augustine was on leave at the time of the dismissal and was not personally involved in the decision to dismiss Mr. Donald. She did confirm however, that she had no further discussions with Mr. Donald concerning absenteeism following the February 8, 2010 letter. There was no evidence to indicate that Ms. Ward was directly involved or participated in the actual decision to dismiss Mr. Donald.

The reference to the February 8th letter is a letter of concern regarding some performance issues, however there was no warning that further issues or concerns could lead to his termination with just cause.

The judge also commented on this first requirement in the following passages:

58 Metepenagiag has failed to meet its burden of proving either the specific reasons for the dismissal or that the reasons pleaded as grounds for dismissal constituted just cause in the circumstances. Again, there was no evidence presented from anyone in authority to speak for the employer, or with direct knowledge, to explain the reasons for Mr. Donald’s dismissal. The reference in the letter of termination from the Band Manager Kenny Levi to the issues and concerns addressed in the letter of February 8, 2010 from Ms. Augustine do not, in my view, articulate or sufficiently specify the particular reasons for dismissal. Neither was any evidence presented from a similar source of authority with the Band to establish the degree of prejudice Mr. Donald’s conduct caused, if any, to the employer, or whether, even solely from Metepenagiag’s perspective, that this purported conduct interfered in some substantial way with the school’s operation as opposed to being primarily a concern of the Band with paying Mr. Donald salary for days when he was not present at the school as appears to be the concern indicated in the letter of February 8, 2010.

59 In such circumstances, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess and determine the specific reasons being relied upon by the defendant to justify the dismissal and more importantly, to determine whether or not the summary dismissal was a just dismissal in the particular circumstances of the case.

As the employee was only half way through a two year fixed contract, the employer was required to pay one years pay for a one year employee.

This case raises some interesting issues :

If the Employer does not set out in the termination letter the reasons for termination, can they even rely on just cause at trial ?
What constitutes sufficient reasons for termination?
If the Employer sets out two reasons for dismissal in the termination letter can they add a third claim later on, without having to rely on the doctrine of after acquired cause?
In the world of unionized labour relations, it is established arbitral law that an Employer must set out all the reasons for termination in the actual termination letter, and any attempt to expand the grounds later on will likely fail unless the employer can prove that it falls within the doctrine of after acquired cause .

Therefore this case should lead employers who intend to rely on just cause to give fulsome reasons in the termination letter. Not only will that insure that the Court will look at the actual merits of the reasons, but it may also have the added benefit of bringing to the attention of the plaintiff’s lawyer that the employer has a serious case of cause.

Imagine if the termination letter said ” On February 5th, 2016 at 5:01 pm, you were observed by a camera at the south warehouse exit removing four boxes of Company product and putting them in the trunk of a 2012 Chevy bearing licence plates YRS2016. We have determined that this car is registered in your name. You were shown this video at your earlier meeting. You denied that you were the person in the video.”

Now imagine that you are Plaintiffs’ potential lawyer and you read this letter. The Plaintiff tells you that this is all a lie and that there has been conspiracy against him by his boss for over 5 years.

Don’t you want to have a look at this video before you take on this file, especially if you are on a contingency fee arrangement?

In Bawa v Royal Bank of Canada ( Supplementary Award-Remedy dated January 1, 2014) Adjudicator Novick , in addition to awarding 9 months pay in lieu of reinstatement, ordered the following three non-monatary remedies against the Bank.

1. To advise the Ontario Securities Commission that Mr. Bawa had been determined to be unjustly dismissed.
2. To provide a letter of recommendation outlining Mr. Bawa’s positions held and stating that his performed his duties in a satisfactory manner. This was later changed to say that the Complainant was ” at times highly rated, and in 2010 was nominated by his Branch Manager for a top performers’ award for his geographic area”
3. Rather than remove all references to his original dismissal for just cause from all Bank records, the Bank was ordered to include in his file a copy of the Adjudicators’ original award finding that his dismissal was unjust.

In Brisebois v Shaw Communications Inc ( 2016 CarswellNat 4227) Adjudicator Peterson ruled that even though the Complainant had not even attended at the hearing and subsequently lost his case, he had no statutory authority to award costs to the Employer as his power to order a remedy was only upon a finding that the Complainant was unjustly dismissed.

Of course there is no doubt that Adjudicators are permitted to award costs in favour of a Complainant as part of their jurisdiction to make the terminated employee whole.

This costs advantage is one more reason that many terminated Federally regulated employees choose to file an Unjust Dismissal complaint under the CLC rather than filing a law suit and exposing themselves to adverse costs awards.

Furthermore, if the Complainants’ lawyer is on a contingency feee arrangement, then they have effectively eliminated any risk of costs exposure for the Complainant in a loss because the client neither has to pay their own lawyer or the Employer’s legal  costs.

In Garrity v Richmond Kinsman Home Support Society ( 2016 BCSC 2204) Justice Pearlman was faced with a plaintiff who claimed that she was constructivley dismissed because of bullying and harassment by a co-worker.

She plead the case as follows :

16. As a result of the Incident, the Defendant’s failure to respond to the Incident, the issuance of the baseless disciplinary letter and the formal demeaning directive, the Plaintiff suffered physical and emotional stress resulting in her taking sick leave on or around January 18, 2016.

18. As a result of the actions and inactions of the Defendant, and the resultant effect on the Plaintiff’s health, the Plaintiff’s Employment was repudiated by the Defendant.

The Defendant took the creative position that as the plaintiff was an employee claiming that she had suffered an injury in the workplace caused by another employee that the BC Workers’ Compensation Act provided that the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal Appeal Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue and therefore no Court could hear the case.

The Court agreed and ordered a stay of the civil lawsuit until such time as the Tribunal had ruled on whether or not they had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.

Although this is BC case, the Ontario Act has similar provisions, so the result could easily be the same.

In Cabott v Urban Systems ( 2016 YKCA 4 ) the Court found that the proper notice period for a 53 year old Engineer with 1 year and 2 months service was 4 months and not the 6 month notice period awarded by the trial judge .

However, what is interesting about this case is the comments that the Court made about notice periods for short service employees. The following quotes illustrate this point:

15] …. the respondent submits that the recent jurisprudence supports a notice period of five to six months in short service cases. While B.C. precedents are consistent that proportionately longer notice periods are appropriate for employees dismissed in the first three years of their employment, I see little support for the proposition that five to six months is the norm in short service cases for employees in their thirties or early forties whose function is significant for their employer, but not one of senior management. … Absent inducement, evidence of a specialized or otherwise difficult employment market, bad faith conduct or some other reason for extending the notice period, the B.C. precedents suggest a range of two to three months for a nine-month employee in the shoes of the respondent when adjusted for age, length of service and job responsibility: ( emphasis added) 

15.  In Hall this court shortened a notice period of seven months to three months for a 42-year-old skilled employee with approximately nine months’ service with his employer. Madam Justice Newbury, for the court, summarized:
[42] Of course, courts of law must also look to what awards have been given in similar cases. In this regard, Ms. Gill referred us to a number of cases involving employees with short-term periods of service in which notice periods of two or three months were selected: see especially Jimmo v. Chief Hauling Contractors Ltd. [2009] C.L.A.D. No. 129 and Allen v. Assaly Holdings Ltd., [1991] 34 C.C.E.L. 81 (Ont. S.C.J.) We were also referred to this court’s decision in Saalfeld v. Absolute Software Corp., 2009 BCCA 18, in which a “norm” of five to six months’ notice in “short service cases for employees in their thirties or early forties whose function is significant for their employer, but not one of senior management,” was rejected. (Para. 15.) The Court suggested that British Columbia precedents indicated a range of two to three months for a nine-month employee in the shoes of the plaintiff in Saalfeld. ( emphasis added) 
. . .
[44] In this case, the trial judge’s choice of seven months as the appropriate period of notice did fall outside the usual range, which as we have seen is generally around two to three months in cases involving short periods of employment and skilled employees who are in their forties. I would allow the appeal on this ground as well. ( Emphasis added) 

18. On the other hand, there is some force to the submission that Ms. Cabott’s position in Whitehorse, described by the judge as senior and supervisory management, involved somewhat greater responsibility than the positions discussed in Saalfeld and Hall. Accepting the description of the range of notice for specialized employees in short term positions as two to three months as observed in Saalfeld and Hall, the character of this employment would justify an award modestly beyond that range.

23. For a short term employee the useful starting place in discussing range is the two to three months spoken of in Saalfeld and Hall. The only feature of this case that would extend that range (there being no special circumstances such as inducement, bad faith or a poor labour market) is a level of responsibility not present in those cases.( emphasis added ) 

Before you thinking  that the Yukon Court of Appeal is not that important , please note that two of the  judges sitting on that Court are actually Court of Appeal judges of the BC Court of Appeal. This decision was written Madame Justice Saunders, the author of many BC employment judgements.

In Sinnathamby v The Chesterfield Shop Limited ( 2016 ONSC 6966) Justice Charney assessed reasonable notice for a 45 year old Senior Customer Service Agent with 14 years service at 10 months.

However, insofar as she did nothing to look for a job for  the first 15 months following her dismissal, he reduced the damages to 6 months notice.

The Judge rejected the Plaintiff’s excuse for not looking for 15 months with these words:

119. The plaintiff acknowledges that she did not begin to look for alternative employment until January 2012, fifteen months after her dismissal. She claims that her medical condition prevented her from looking for work before that period. As already indicated, the plaintiff has filed no admissible medical evidence to support her claim that she could not work prior to January 2012.

122. In the absence of any admissible medical evidence to support this delay I conclude that it is appropriate to reduce the notice period for which the plaintiff is entitled to damages to six months.

Upon first reading these paragraphs, one might think that the Plaintiff submitted no medical evidence, however the Judge spent considerable time reviewing her medical evidence and found it to be wanting at best. This is what he found:

Medical Evidence
74. The plaintiff alleges that she was “diagnosed by Dr. Chen as suffering from depression, hypertension and anxiety”. She also claims that as a result of her wrongful dismissal she has “suffered further depression, mental distress and emotional anguish”. She alleges that her illness “stemmed from work related stress and prevented her from seeking and obtaining alternative employment”.
75. These allegations are unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. Dr. Chen did not file an affidavit on this motion. Even the medical documents that the plaintiff did file belie this claim. None of the doctor’s notes filed by the plaintiff include any such diagnosis. The hospital records relating to her emergency visit to Toronto Western Hospital on September 17, 2010 filed by the plaintiff state that the plaintiff’s “presenting complaint” was “vertigo” and the clinical notes state that she “came to ER because it takes 2 weeks to see family MD”. The notes indicate that she should take gravol as needed for nausea. The triage assessment states that her chief complaint was dizziness and that she “reported intermittent dizziness x 2 weeks”. There is no reference to depression, hypertension, anxiety, mental distress or emotional anguish, let alone any evidence linking such diagnosis to her dismissal from Chesterfield.
76. The medical report from October 27, 2010 states that she is a 44 year old female who presents with dizziness and imbalance. It states:
Mrs. Sinnathamby states that approximately two months ago she developed upper respiratory tract infection for which she was started on antibiotics. That eventually resolved but subsequent to that she developed episodes of vertigo. She describes them as true vertigo, and positional in nature, worse when in a lying down position. She has no associated fluctuating hearing loss, no aural fullness and no tinnitus. She otherwise has no focal neurological features. In particular she has no symptoms consistent with vertebrobasilar insufficiency. Since having started the BETAHISTINE she does feel that her symptoms are improving.
77. None of these records contains any reference to depression, hypertension, anxiety, mental distress or emotional anguish. All of her medical records up to and including July 2011 relate to dizziness and vertigo.
78. There are some barely legible clinical notes commencing September 2011 that state that the plaintiff is “depressed”, but in the absence of an expert affidavit to explain the relevance or significance of these cryptic references they do not meet the “best foot forward” obligation imposed on a party moving for summary judgment.
79. The plaintiff places particular reliance on a clinical note dated January 18, 2012 that, again, is barely legible. The parts that can be read state:
Sleeping better . . . overall better. Was terminated at work. Depressed at home. Will look for job.
80. In the absence of an expert affidavit explaining the relevance and significance of these comments they do not support her claim for mental distress or her claim that she was unable to return to work prior to January of 2012. Even on its face the clinical note does not indicate that Dr. Chen advised her that she could not return to work prior to January 18, 2012; it appears that she made the decision to look for a job herself. The note appears to reflect what the patient has reported to the doctor and not what the doctor has diagnosed.
81 .Indeed, the plaintiff was aware that she required an affidavit from her doctor to support the allegations made in this lawsuit. Dr. Chen’s final clinical note dated January 5, 2016 states “Upset/depressed re: wrongful dismissal, wants affidavit re: medical condition at the time — off work ~ 1year since Sep. 2010. Now has moved on — different job. Still has unresolved ill feelings”.
82. No such affidavit was provided, but Dr. Chen did provide the plaintiff with an undated note stating: “This is to certify that Suchitha may return to work as of January 18, 2012”.
83. The note, by itself, is not particularly helpful. It does not indicate whether or why she was not able to return to work earlier. It does not provide a date range of when the plaintiff was unable to work or why. It appears to be carefully drafted to say as little as possible. Since it is not part of an expert affidavit that can be cross-examined it cannot be used to support the plaintiff’s claim on a motion for summary judgment.
84. There is some dispute as to when this undated note from Dr. Chen was written. All of Dr. Chen’s other notes were dated. The undated note was not included in the plaintiff’s original affidavit dated April 4, 2016. On cross-examination she gave conflicting evidence, initially stating that she could not recall when she received the note or how it came into her possession. I agree with counsel for the defendant that the note was likely written by Dr. Chen around the same time as the plaintiff’s reply affidavit (September 13, 2016) because Dr. Chen was unable or unwilling to provide an affidavit. Pursuant to Rule 20.02(1) I have drawn an adverse inference from the plaintiff’s failure to provide an affidavit from Dr. Chen or any other medical expert.
85. I have dealt with the plaintiff’s medical allegations in some detail because they are allegations that are subject to objective verification. Other allegations (such as the dispute regarding the telephone calls between the plaintiff and Mr. Bochynek) are more difficult to resolve on an objective basis. It is clear from the medical records provided by the plaintiff that she complained of dizziness and was diagnosed with vertigo in September/October 2010. Yet her affidavit makes no mention of vertigo or dizziness, and claims instead that she was diagnosed with depression, hypertension, anxiety, mental distress and emotional anguish.
86. Based on this objective inconsistency between her affidavit and her medical records I find that the plaintiff is not a credible or reliable witness. There are other parts of her affidavit evidence that are also unreliable (I will address these later), and at the end of the day I am inclined to believe Mr. Bochynek’s versions of events rather then the plaintiff’s.

It seems that the  Judge was not particularly pleased with the Plaintiff putting forth a less than believable medical excuse for not looking for a job. His award of 6 months ( 26 weeks ) is only 4 weeks more than her ESA minimums of 22 weeks.

In Bellini v. Ausenco Engineering Alberta Incorporated (2016 NSSC 237) the Court was faced with the following termination provision:

In Schinnerl v Kwantien Polytechnic University ( 2016 BCSC 2026) Justice Steeves found that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages when she turned down a full time job but accepted a part time job so that she could continue her PhD studies.

The Court commented as follows:

[36] In my view, the plaintiff was certainly entitled to negotiate a change from full‑time to part-time work so she could get closer to completion of her PhD studies. However, that is a separate matter from her duty to mitigate the damages she is entitled to from her dismissal by the defendant. By turning down full-time work at Douglas College but then seeking damages for full-time work she is essentially claiming that her former employer should pay for part of her continuing education. It is true that the education commenced with the defendant but its obligation to contribute ended under its educational leave policy as well as with the plaintiff’s dismissal.

[37] I can agree with the plaintiff that a dismissed employee is entitled to consider her long-term interests but I do not agree this means her former employer is required to pay for the interests of the plaintiff at issue here. Nor do I agree that the plaintiff is entitled to be placed in the best possible position in relation to her long-term career objective following her dismissal. The plaintiff relies on previous judgments but they can be distinguished on the facts because there was no alternate position available to the dismissed employee (for example, Haff v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc., 2013 BCSC 1720 (CanLII), at para. 70). Similarly, the efforts of a disabled former employee to refocus his vocational aspirations in the absence of alternate work is a different case than the subject one (Birch v. London Drugs Ltd., 2003 BCSC 1253 (CanLII), at para. 27).

[38] In my view the subject case is analogous to a previous judgment where it was held that a dismissed employee cannot elect to take further training with the cost of the training as a charge against the former employer (Cimpan v. Kolumbia Inn Daycare Society, 2006 BCSC 1828 (CanLII), at para. 107).

[39] In summary, the defendant’s obligation to pay notice to the plaintiff ended on June 13, 2016, when the plaintiff commenced employment with Douglas College. That was the date the plaintiff had the opportunity to work full-time and mitigate all of her damages after that date. She was entitled to choose not to take full-time employment but the cost of that choice does not lie with the defendant.

In Morison v Ergo-Industrial Seating Systems Inc. ( 2016 ONSC 6725) Justice Rogers held that reasonable notice for a 58 year old Regional Sales Manager with 8 years service making $211,000 annually was 12 months .

But the Judge did not stop there. The judge was very concerned about the defendants’ conduct and considered that in analyzing both the issue of aggravated damages and punitive damages.

This is what the Court said  about aggravated damages :

40. It is clear that an employer can allege just cause as a ground for dismissal and that abandoning cause at any stage, in the course of the action, does not necessarily mean that such conduct should attract aggravated damages. Provided the employer had a reasonable basis on which it believed it could dismiss an employee for cause, a finding of bad faith will not automatically follow: see Mulvihill v. Ottawa (City), 2008 ONCA 201, 90 O.R. (3d) 285, at paras. 49, 55 .
41 However, in this case, the evidence is rather clear that the plaintiff was simply not a good fit with his new immediate superior (Exhibit 1, tab 19 being a convincing example). It is equally clear that this superior knew someone she respected who expressed interest in Mr. Morison’s position. The defendant was interested in trying someone new who had what the defendant perceived was a more positive disposition towards the healthcare sector. The defendant was clearly entitled to these beliefs and to hire someone else. However, none of this constituted reasonable belief in just cause.
42. Considering all the evidence on this issue, I conclude that alleging cause was an integral part of the defendant’s negotiation strategy. The defendant was counselled in September 2012 that it would not be able to establish cause. The defendant alluded to a possibility of alleging cause in its dismissal letter. The defendant then alleged cause in its defence and adopted a rather aggressive position while providing no convincing evidence at trial that could support its alleged reasonable belief in cause or that it was reasonably justified in initially adopting a position of just cause.
43. This is exactly the kind of conduct mentioned in Honda v. Keays as an example of conduct in dismissal that could result in aggravated damages. I find that the defendant did not act fairly or in good faith in the manner of dismissal of Mr. Morison as the defendant was not candid, reasonably honest, nor forthright with Mr. Morison. The defendant, by its allegations made with no reasonable basis in support thereof, attacked the reputation of Mr. Morison by making misrepresentations regarding the reasons for his dismissal for financial gain (i.e. seeking a better outcome in its negotiations with Mr. Morison). This is a classic example of bad faith.

However the Judge noted that to award monetary damages there had to be evidence of actual damages sustained. The Court commented as follows:

45. On this point, the evidence in this case is quite different from that in Middleton v. Highlands East (Municipality), 2013 ONSC 763, 8 M.P.L.R. (5th) 114, where the Court found, at para. 142, sufficient evidence of mental distress. Here, the evidence of mental distress caused by the manner of dismissal cannot be dissociated from the usual anguish and stress resulting from having one’s employment terminated. I point out that I am not concerned with the lack of a medical report (on which time was spent during closing arguments), but rather with the lack of convincing evidence of mental distress on which I could properly assess damages resulting from the manner of dismissal. By way of example, some of the plaintiff’s evidence on this related to how he was in a fog when he found out by a friend that he would be dismissed and how this was a horrible day, with other parts of his evidence relating to his financial distress. Despite mentioning that the allegations of cause got his back up and caused him some upset, his evidence in that regard was extremely superficial and lacked particulars. The evidence is not at all convincing and is simply not sufficient to warrant any damages in this context, since normal distress and hurt feelings resulting from a dismissal areensable. For these reasons, the facts relevant to damages in this case are quite different from those in cases such as Boucher v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2014 ONCA 419, 120 O.R. (3d) 481, and Strudwick v. Applied Consumer & Clinical Evaluations Inc., 2016 ONCA 520, and do not give rise to compensable damages.
46. As indicated in Canada (A.G.) v. Robitaille, 2011 FC 1218, at para. 38, the employee’s testimony may be sufficient to establish such damages and the absence of medical evidence does not deny the damages suffered by the employee as long as there is evidence of such damages and evidence of a causal connection between the moral injury and the wrongful conduct.

However, there is no need to prove actual damages in order to award punitive damages. In the following strong language the Judge awarded punitive damages in the amount of $50,000:

52. In this case, the defendant committed an actionable wrong independent of the underlying claim for damages for breach of contract: the breach of its duty of good faith, as found above.
53. I find the facts of this case particularly troubling. Not only did the defendant assert cause when there was no reasonable basis for such an assertion, the defendant delayed in providing the plaintiff his record of employment, and significantly delayed in paying amounts owing under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, until June 15, 2015. This had a significant financial impact on the plaintiff and the employer had knowledge of the plaintiff’s financial circumstances. Moreover, the allegations of cause, made with no reasonable basis, were made for tactical and financial gain considerations.
54. I had the advantage of listening to the evidence and observing the witnesses and I find such conduct to be reprehensible. It exceeds what might be considered as ill-advised. The allegations of cause, made with no reasonable basis, and the significantly delayed payment of statutory amounts were intentional and financially impacted the plaintiff. These actions of the defendant were designed to financially benefit the defendant and the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff’s precarious financial position. Such a conduct is “malicious, oppressive and high-handed” and “a marked departure from ordinary standards of decent behaviour”. A similar finding was made in Kelly v. Norsemont Mining Inc., 2013 BCSC 147, at para. 115.
55. Since I have awarded no amount for aggravated damages, the pitfalls of double-compensation or double-punishment mentioned in Honda v. Keays is avoided if I award punitive damages.
56 .Considering the facts of this case, I find that an award of punitive damages is rationally required to punish the defendant and to meet the objectives of retribution, deterrence, and denunciation. Employers cannot be allowed to behave in such a fashion without a clear message being sent by this Court that this is not acceptable.

The facts that justified an award of aggravated damages were virtually the same as those relied upon for punitive damages, which reinforces my belief that they are one and the same.

In order to get over the hurdle that the Plaintiff was not committed to a mental health facility as a result of the defendants’ actions,  the Court simply recast the defendants’ behaviour in the language of punitive damages and came to the same result.

To somewhat  paraphrase Michelle Obama, ” When the Employer goes low, the Court will go high.”

In Reeve v 2265480 Ontario  Ltd cob Hidden Valley Resort, ( 2016 ONSC 5273) Justice Glass of the Divisional Court overturned a Small Claims Court judge who actually said in his judgement that  in determining the notice period he was ” arbitrarily ” choosing one month.

Justice Glass determined that Plaintiff, who was employed as a Manager for only 3 months, was entitled to receive 4 months notice, in part because he had a managerial job, he had moved his family from Toronto to Huntsville, was not on probation, was not given any guidance as to his alleged performance problems and it took 9 months for him  to find a new job.

It is interesting to think what would have happened if the Small Claims Court judge  had not used the word ” arbitrary” and instead  had said ” Considering the relevant Bardal factors, I find that reasonable notice is one month”.