7 Months Employment Plus 12 Year Inducement = 14 Months Notice

In Miller v. Alaya Care Inc., 2025 ONSC 1028 (CanLII) Justice Carroccia had a situation of a 62 year old VP making over $250K with only 7 months service who was terminated without cause. Having set aside an illegal termination clause, the Judge focussed on the issue of whether the Plaintiff had been induced to leave her previous job of 12 years and if so, what effect that would have on the notice period.

First the Judge listed these factors to consider :

1. the reasonable expectations of both parties;

2. whether the employee sought out work with the prospective employer;

3. whether there were assurances of long-term employment;

4. whether the employee did due diligence before accepting the position by conducting their own inquiry into the company;

5. whether the discussions between the employer and prospective employee amounted to more than the persuasion or the normal “courtship” that occurs between an employer and a prospective employee;

6. the length of time the employee remained in the new position, the element of inducement tending to lessen with the longevity of the employment; and

7. the age of the employee at termination and the length of employment with the previous employer.

Applying these factors to this case, the Judge said as follows:

[88]        In my view, these discussions initiated by the defendant go beyond the normal “courtship” between an employer and prospective employee and amount to an inducement. The following circumstances support this finding:

1.     The defendant reached out to the plaintiff first.

2.     There were representations made by AlayaCare that the plaintiff’s experience would assist in “growing” the company.

3.     Inquiries were made by AlayaCare as to the extent of the plaintiff’s renumeration with WellSky ( her previous employer of 12 years, editors note) , including bonuses and RSUs so that they could “lure” her.

4.     AlayaCare had hired a number of people in 2021 as part of an “aggressive growth strategy”.

5.     The defendant was prepared to go as far as indemnifying the plaintiff in the event that her previous employer commenced litigation against her for leaving them to join AlayaCare.

[89]        As a result, I find that there were inducements offered to the plaintiff to lure her to leave her employment with WellSky to become an employee of AlayaCare. This factor favours a longer period of notice.

My comments :

Inducement is often pleaded but it rarely works. This case sets out the type of evidence that is needed to prove inducement .

Under most circumstances a 13 year Senior Executive who was 62 years of age would receive a notice period greater than 14 months. On the other hand, without inducement, a 7 month employee would never get 14 months notice.

Inducement seems to give you a notice period greater than your actual employment with the defendant but less than the combined service of the two employers. This recognizes that the Plaintiff is always taking a risk with a new employer but that no reasonable person would leave a secure job of long service without the expectation that the new job would last some significant period of time.

I do not usually list who the winning lawyer is, but in this case I make an exception because Plaintiff’s counsel was none other than this years winner of the Ontario Bar Association Randall Echlin Award for Excellence in Labour and Employment Law, Stephen Moreau of Cavalluzzo LLP.

Bragging Note : I was the recipient of this award last year.

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If a Termination Clause Limits Insurance Coverage for the ESA Period to Only When Coverage is Available from the Insurer, the Clause is Illegal:

In Ramotar v Trader Corporation ( No Canlii cite yet ) Deputy Judge K. Qureshi of the Toronto Small Claims Court reviewed a termination provision which had the following language :

“If your employment is terminated without cause, the Company will continue your group insurance benefit coverage for such period as the Employment Standards Act, 2000 shall require, provided such coverage is available from the insurer.”

The Deputy Judge found that as the employee would still be entitled to payment in lieu of such benefits if the insurance company did not cover the claim, the whole clause was illegal as it was not in compliance with the ESA.

My Commentary;

Presumably the Deputy Judge was referring to Section 60 (1) (c) and (3) of the ESA which reads as follows:

60.(1) Requirements during notice period. During a notice period. required under Section 57 or 58, the employer,

(c) shall continue to make whatever benefit plan contributions would be required to be made in order to maintain the employee’s benefits under the plan until the end of the notice period .

(3) Benefit Plan Contributions : If an employer fails to contribute to a benefit plan contrary to clause (1) (c), an amount equal to the amount he employer should have contributed shall be deemed to be unpaid wages for the purpose of Section 103.

Note that the employer is not required to provide the coverage, only to pay the premium cost to the insurance company.

But if the employer fails to make the necessary premium payment and as a result the employee incurs an expense or a loss that would have been covered , then the employee can pursue a civil action against the employer. I once had a case where the employer failed to continue my clients’ $100,000 life insurance policy after his termination. My client died during the ESA notice period and after the insurance company denied coverage, we successfully sued the employer and got them to pay the $100,000.

This obligation to maintain benefits continues under the common law throughout the reasonable notice period. This can lead to huge negative consequences when an employee becomes disabled during the common law notice period. The employer cannot, under the terms of most group disability plans , continue to provide for LTD coverage after the statutory notice period. Therefore if the employee were to become totally disabled during the common law notice period, the employer steps into the shoes of the LTD insurer and is on the hook for what could be a sum well in excess of responsible notice.

See Prince v. T. Eaton Co. Limited, 1992 CanLII 5968 (BC CA)

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Trial Judge Must Follow Trial Ruling in Dufault v Township of Ignace:

In Baker v. Van Dolder’s Home Team Inc., 2025 ONSC 952 (CanLII) Justice Sproat made two important rulings on the enforceability of a termination clause :
1) The “without cause” clause had a fatal error of saying ” we may terminate your employment at any time,”. applying the law of stare decisis , Justice Sproat applied the trial decision in Dufault v. The Corporation of the Township of Ignace and said :
12]       ” I must apply Dufault, as none of the reasons to depart from a prior decision referenced in Spruce Mills are applicable. As such, the “without cause” termination provision is unenforceable.”This should put to rest  the argument that because the Court of Appeal in Dufault did not address the issue of “at any time ” it somehow is not the law of the land. This case confirms that the law is made by trial judges , unless overturned by a higher court .

2) The “with cause” clause was as follows:

3.   Termination with cause: we may terminate your employment at any time for just cause, without prior notice or compensation of any kind, except any minimum compensation or entitlements prescribed by the Employment Standards Act. Just cause includes the following conduct:
a.   Poor performance, after having been notified in writing of the required standard;
b.   Dishonesty relevant to your employment (such as misleading statements, falsifying documents and misrepresenting your qualifications for the position you were hired for);
c.   Theft, misappropriation or improper use of the company’s property;
d.   Violent or harassing conduct towards other employees or customers;
e.   Intentional or grossly negligent disclosure of privileged or confidential information about the company;
f.    Any conduct which would constitute just cause under the common law or statute.

Justice Sproat found that the clause was not saved by the addition of the language ” except any minimum compensation or entitlements prescribed by the Employment Standards Act. ”

Instead he said :

[19]       ” The potential unfairness of a termination provision of the sort at issue is that the employer has described in detail the contractual standard of just cause but given no detail or explanation of the ESA wilful misconduct standard, and that it differs from the contractual standard. Given that many employees will not be familiar with the ESA provisions, many employees would assume that they had no entitlement if they breached the contractual standards.”

The lesson here is for a clause to be enforceable, it must be compliant with the ESA on its face. You cannot say something illegal and try to cover it up with a provision that says except or unless the ESA says otherwise.

For a copy of this case, email me at barry@barryfisher.ca
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Barry B. Fisher LL.B.

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Employer May be Able to Rely on a Valid Without Just Cause Termination Clause Even if They Allege Just Cause and Fail.

In Singh v Clark Builders, 2025 ABKB 3 Justice Becker Brooks had a situation where the employer alleged just cause and therefore did not pay the 90 day contractual severance clause in the contract.

The Judge found that there was no just cause.

Could the employer still rely on the 90 day clause or did they repudiate the contract and thus have to pay common law notice, which in this case was held to be 12 months ?

First the Judge accepted these 4 principles :

  1. Where an employer alleges cause and fails, or withdraws its cause allegation, or repudiates an employment agreement through acts which constitute constructive dismissal, the employer is not precluded from subsequently invoking a without cause termination provision for the purpose of calculating the employee’s damages: Roden, Moore, Simpson.
  2. However, in all cases, it is a question of construction of the without cause termination provision before the Court as to whether, properly construed, the without cause termination provision applies. Such clauses are subject to strict construction: Ebert, Matthews.
  3. Even if the contract, properly construed, permits an employer to terminate without cause after a failed for cause termination, there are some breaches or acts of repudiation which are so significant, or of such an order of magnitude, that they render a without cause termination provision unenforceable: Dixon. Although Dixon has not specifically been considered and accepted by appellate courts, I find the reasoning compelling. All employment agreements are negotiated and agreed to on the basis of certain implied minimum expectations as to how the employer will conduct itself, the duty of good faith being one. An employee’s agreement to accept terms which significantly impact on the employee’s common law rights must be taken to be made in the expectation that the employer will comply with these minimum implied expectations. Where the employer significantly departs from such expectations, in my view, the employee should not be held to extremely disadvantageous provisions which he, she or they agreed to. This is not rewriting the contract but giving effect to what the parties must reasonably have intended.
  4. However, minor or technical mistakes made in good faith by the employer will not constitute a repudiation sufficient to prevent the employer from relying upon the without cause termination provision: Amberer, Oudin.

The Judge then ruled as follows:

[92] An employer’s failure to establish just cause will not disentitle the employer from enforcing an otherwise valid without cause termination provision provided the allegations of just cause are made in good faith: Simpson v Global Warranty, 2014 ONSC 6916 at para 8.

[93] In my reading of the authorities surveyed in Humphrey, provided there is a good faith basis for the employer to allege just cause, both at termination and during litigation, an employer who subsequently decides not to pursue just cause or is unable to prove just cause, is notprecluded from relying on a without cause termination provision.n

[94] The good faith requirement means the allegation of just cause cannot be brought dishonestly or for an improper, dishonest, or fraudulent purpose.

My Comments :

The process would seem to unfold as follows:

  1. If just cause is alleged initially but dropped before trial and the defendant subsequently pays the contractual severance, the issue would be whether the initial allegation of just cause was made in good faith.
  2. If just cause is alleged and not dropped and then the Court finds that there was no just cause, the issue would be whether the allegation, although not proven, was made in good faith.
  3. Remember this is only relevant where the without cause termination clause is valid.
  4. It appears that this may be the same analysis in a constructive dismissal case. Therefore even if the plaintiff wins the constructive dismissal argument, unless they can show that the employer acted in bad faith, they will be limited to their contractual severance, not common law notice.

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Refusing to Pay Contractual Severance Without a Release Nullifies the Termination Clause :

In Timmins v. Artisan Cells ( 2024 ONSC 7123 Justice Callaghan had a situation where the employment contract called for a payment of 3 months pay upon a without cause dismissal. The contract did not require the employee to sign a release.

The employer refused to pay that amount unless the Plaintiff signed a release, which he refused to do. The employer then only paid one week of termination pay, even though the ESA minimum entitlement was 3 weeks.

The Court found that the employer had repudiated the contract and therefore could not rely on the termination clause. The Plaintiff was therefore entitled to common law reasonable notice.

The Court then awarded 9 months notice to the 44 year old Vice President who had 3. 5 years service.

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Court of Appeal Upholds Dufault v Town of Ignace Trial Decision :

In Dufault v. Ignace (Township), 2024 ONCA 915 [25] the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the Town of Ignace in seeking to overturn the trial decision which held that the termination clause was illegal and thus unenforceable .

The Court upheld the trial judges decision that the clause was illegal because of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc., 2020 ONCA 391.

Of more importance is what they did not do :

“Given our conclusion that the “for cause” termination clause of the employment contract is unenforceable as contrary to the ESA and that, pursuant to Waksdale, this renders all of the termination provisions unenforceable, it is not necessary to consider the appellant’s arguments that the motion judge erred in finding the “without cause” termination clause also unenforceable as contrary to the ESA, and we expressly do not rule on that submission. The appellant argued that the motion judge’s findings in relation to the “without cause” termination clause may affect other employment contracts. In our view, resolution of the issues the appellant raises regarding the “without cause” termination clause should be left to an appeal where it would directly affect the outcome. “

My Comment:

In my opinion the Court did what they should have done, which is not to comment on issues that would not have changed the outcome. From a practical point of view this means that the “sole discretion ” and the ” at any time ” arguments will continue to be raised in future cases.

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One Month Employment Gets Seasonal Worker Five Months Notice :

In Smith v Lyndebrook Golf Inc., 2024 CanLII 103671 (ON SCSM) Deputy Judge David M. José had a situation where a 51 year old Golf Superintendent with one months service was entitled to 5 months notice, due largely to the fact that he was a seasonal employee who was terminated mid season and therefore would have a more difficult time getting a job than a non-seasonal employee.

This is what the judge said :

59) I agree with the observations of Gunn J. in Jordison, supra, that “in determining the appropriate notice period, the factors set out in Bardal, supra, must be considered along with the unique circumstances of seasonal employment, such as the length of time remaining until the season begins or until the season ends and the limited employment prospects in the off-season.”


60) In the present case, Smith was a very short-term employee, fired early mid-season. Clearly not an ideal time to be fired from this type of job. In my view, the level of reasonable notice for seasonal workers, is very dependent on when in the season (or off-season) their employment was terminated, and the type of position that they held. The amount of reasonable notice for a short-term general labourer in a seasonal position will, in my view, be much more modest than for a long-term skilled worker, in a seasonal position. A general labourer groundskeeper at a golf course, for example, can more readily transfer their shovel, wheelbarrow, and tractor driving skillset to a broad range of alternative jobs, whereas a specialist, like Smith, can only replace his work at another golf course, and those positions would not be readily available, especially mid-season.

61) Working against Smith is his short tenure with Lyndebrook. Working in his favour, however, is his very skilled position with the employer, and being fired mid-season which would, on a balance of probabilities, make reemployment in his field very difficult: something that Lyndebrook didn’t hotly contest, and nor could they, in my view, given O’Brien’s concession that these positions should be shored up before the season, and her admission that Smith was the only Golf Superintendent to respond to her late employment posting.

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Another 24 Month Notice Period Case:

In  Maximenko v. Zim, 2024 ONSC 5540 Justice Brownstone awarded 24 months notice to an almost 59 year old General Manager with almost 21 years service who was making approximately $160,000 / year .

In determining the appropriate bonus calculation for the notice period, the three year average was $27,725. However in the calendar year in which the Plaintiff was terminated ( March 2023) no one received a bonus.

This case was heard in September of 2024 and therefore the Judge had to deal with a year in which no bonus was paid and another year in which the bonuses had not yet been determined .

This how the Judge dealt with that issue :

[42] There is no evidence regarding 2024 annual bonuses. Zim’s suggestion of a 47 percent reduction presumes no annual bonuses will be payable for 2024. I do not accept that assumption. 2023 is the only year since annual bonuses were instituted that they have not been paid. I find it more likely than not that the annual bonuses will be payable for 2024. If this were not going to be the case, Zim is the only party that could have adduced that evidence. It did not do so. I therefore reduce the average bonus amount by 23.5 percent to reflect the lack of annual bonus in 2023.

My comments :

I would have thought that the better way to determine the bonus over the notice period would be for the remainder of 2023 ( 9 months ) she would receive no bonus, because nobody else did.

Then for the balance of the notice period ( 15 months ) apply either the pre 2023 three year average ($27, 725) or the three year average of 2023, 2022 and 2021 which is $22,663 .

This would have produced a bonus over the notice period of

$22,663 /12 X 15 = $28,328 as opposed to the $42,420 awarded by the Judge

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3 Year Fixed Term Employment Agreement Not Affected by Early Termination Clause .

In Bouchard v Facility Condition Assessment Portfolio Experts Ontario Ltd., 2024 BCSC 1870, Justice Walken was faced with a situation where the Plaintiff had sold his company to the Defendant by way of two agreements :

1) Share Purchase Agreement :

12. CONSULTING AGREEMENT
The principal of the Vendor, [Mr. Bouchard] agrees to enter into an employment contract which shall be for no less than 3 years on terms agreeable to both the parties based on the existing employment of [Mr. Bouchard] by the Vendor. Any probationary periods for [Mr. Bouchard] shall be waived.

2) Employment Agreement :

FCAPX may terminate your employment at any time for cause.
FCAPX may terminate your employment without cause at any time by providing you with notice, or pay in lieu of such notice, and any severance pay required by the Employment Standards Act.
In the event a temporary layoff is ever required, it may be implemented in accordance with the requirements of the Employment Standards Act.

The Judge first determined that on its face this was a 3 year fixed term agreement. However the law allows the parties to provide for an early termination provision, which it did.

However the Employment Agreement also contained this unusual clause :

“Any conditions included in the Share Purchase Agreement between Ally Engineering and FCAPX will supersede any related/relevant clause within this agreement.”

The Judge then simply said ” [58]      I find that in the present case, the contract between the parties did not provide for without cause early termination of the three-year fixed-term.

My Comments :

It is unfortunate that the Judge did not articulate how that conclusion was reached. I assume that the the rationale was that because there was a clear contradiction between a 3 year fixed term contract vs an early termination clause, the superseding clause applied and the early termination clause was ignored.

If there was no superseding clause, would the result have been different?

Another way to invalidate this early termination clause was that it offended the Waksdale case, insofar as the agreement referred to just cause which is not the standard in the Ontario ESA. Furthermore the clause did not provide for the continuation of benefits during the statutory notice period and that too is fatal in Ontario. Although this was a BC case, the parties agreed that Ontario law applied.

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Barry B. Fisher LL.B.

Ontario Court Reaffirms That a Saving Clause in an Illegal Termination Provision Does Not Cure the Problem :

In Wilds v. 1959612 Ontario Inc., 2024 ONSC 3452 (CanLII) Justice Vermette found multiple ESA violations in the employment contract.

In determining whether the savings clause was sufficient to offset these illegal provisions, this is what the judge said :

[64]        The last paragraph of section 15.1 of the Employment Agreement is a “saving provision”. For convenience, I reproduce this paragraph again:

It is intended that this termination provision includes any entitlements you have pursuant to the Act. In the event that your entitlements pursuant to the Actexceed these contractual provisions, those statutory provisions shall replace these contractual provisions and no further payments are required. You agree that the provision of notice, pay in lieu, or a combination of both as set out above will fully satisfy all obligations of the Organization to you, whether arising pursuant to statute, common law or otherwise, and that you will have no further entitlement to notice, pay in lieu, or severance arising out of your employment or the termination thereof. To be clear, these provisions replace any common law entitlement that you would otherwise have.

[65]        Gibson’s attempts to contract out of the ESA in the termination provisions cannot be saved by this paragraph: see Perretta at para. 58. This paragraph cannot reconcile the parts of the termination provisions that are and have been in direct conflict with the ESA from the outset. See Rossman at paras. 35, 40-41. The statement at the beginning of the paragraph that the intention of the termination provisions is to include any entitlement that the employee has pursuant to the ESA is contradicted by clear violations of the ESA in the termination provisions. Such language creates ambiguity and confusion for an employee and does not constitute clear wording that allows an employee to know at the beginning of their employment what their entitlement will be at the end of their employment. In my view, the termination provisions in the Employment Agreement were not drafted with strict compliance with the ESA as their main objective. See Waksdale at para. 7.

[53]           A severability clause in an employment agreement does not have any effect on clauses of the agreement that have been made void by statute, and cannot be used to rewrite, read down or interpret the terms of the agreement so as to provide for the minimum standard imposed by the ESA.  See Waksdale at para. 14 and North v. Metaswitch Networks Corporation, 2017 ONCA 790 at para. 44

[54]        Further, “saving provisions” in termination clauses cannot save employers who attempt to contract out of the ESA’s minimum standards, and cannot reconcile a provision that is in direct conflict with the ESA from the outset. Holding otherwise creates the risk that employers will slip sentences into employment contracts in the hope that employees will accept the terms. This outcome exploits vulnerable employees who hold unequal bargaining power in contract negotiations. Moreover, it flouts the purpose of the ESA – to protect employees and to ensure that employers treat them fairly upon termination. Employers cannot be permitted to draft provisions that capitalize on the fact that many employees are unaware of their legal rights and will often refrain from challenging notice provisions in court. Attempting to reconcile the provisions of a termination clause with the benefit of hindsight runs counter to the remedial purpose of the ESA. See Rossman at paras. 35, 40-41.

My Comments :

This case definitively determines that neither savings clauses or severability clauses can fix an otherwise illegal termination provision.

Therefore a termination clause will only be enforceable if on its face, there is no violation of the ESA.

If you would like a copy of this case, email me at barry@barryfisher.ca

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