Category: Uncategorized
Increase in UBER Earnings Post Dismissal Not Deducted from Damage Award :
Sexual Assault is by Definition Serious Misconduct :
In AG Growth International Inc v Dupont ( 2021 ABQB) Justice Little, sitting on appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court found that the trial judge had made a error of law when he failed to begin his analysis of the actions of the Plaintiff by starting with the premise that a sexual assault is automatically at the high end misconduct.
This is a brief summary of the incident:
a) before January 9 RT ( a female coworker) and Mr. Dupont were workplace acquaintances, but they were not good friends;
(b) at about 8:00 a.m. on January 9 Mr. Dupont asked RT to go on a date with him and in reply she said “maybe”;
(c) at about 9:25 a.m. on January 9 Mr. Dupont approached RT while they were both working at the Westeel facility in Olds, Alberta and asked her if she was chilly and said “Now that you’re single we can go on a date”;
(d) Mr. Dupont then reached over and lifted RT’s hoodie and Tshirt, exposing the area of her body extending from her bellybutton to her bra, including her bra;
(e) Mr. Dupont did this because he wanted to flirt with and “hit on” RT, and he wanted to show her that he “liked her a lot”;
(f) Mr. Dupont did not intend to lift RT’s T-shirt when he lifted her hoodie;
(g) Mr. Dupont did not intend expose any part of RT’s body when he lifted her hoodie;
(h) Mr. Dupont’s actions caught RT by surprise, and caused her to be anxious, distressed and embarrassed, and caused her to fear Mr. Dupont;
(i) RT immediately swore at Mr. Dupont and slapped his hand away;
This what the Court said about the correct way to start the analysis in a case of this nature :
IV. Analysis
Ground One: Level of Seriousness of Misconduct
[8] Determination as to whether summary dismissal is justified requires an analysis of the proportionality of the employer’s response to the misconduct. That analysis begins with a determination of the seriousness of the misconduct.
[9] Consideration of the following excerpt from the trial decision suffices to dispose of the appeal on this first ground:
[87] In the present case, Mr. Dupont’s action constituted a single, brief and isolated incident of unwanted touching of RT, for the purpose of flirting with RT in order to pursue a romantic relationship with her. Upon realizing that his advances were not welcome he did not persist, but immediately desisted and walked away.
[88] While I do not discount the effect that his actions had upon RT, they fall at the low end of the “spectrum of seriousness” referred to at para 205 of Foederer and cited at para 90 in Willow Park Golf Course Ltd.
[10] A finding that intentional and unwanted touching for a sexual purpose (Trial decision para 83) constitutes sexual harassment at the low end of the spectrum of seriousness ignores our Court of Appeal’s determination that sexual assault is at the high end of that spectrum:
Sexual assault, by its very definition, is serious misconduct: Calgary (City) v CUPE Local 37, 2019 ABCA 388 at para 11)
[11] Recognizing that Calgary v CUPE dealt with the standard of review of an arbitrator’s decision, it nevertheless stands for the proposition that in this case, the trial judge’s starting point in the proportionality analysis should have been that the impugned conduct was on the high end of the spectrum of seriousness.
…
[15] Since a sexual assault is what occurred, the whole analysis ought to have been conducted with that finding in mind: Calgary v CUPE para 33
[16] Having commenced the correct analysis but from the incorrect starting point, the trial judge’s decision cannot survive review on a correctness standard.
My Comments :
Presumably the analysis should have been as follows
1) Did the conduct amount to sexual assault ?
2) If yes, then this is serious misconduct .
3) Are there any mitigating factors which would indicate that termination for just cause was a disproportionate response ?
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Retraining Costs Allowed Even Through Plaintiff Did Not Get a New Job Within the Notice Period:
Plaintiff Wins $34,000 in Expense Reimbursement Even After Signing Release:
Costs of $80,000 Awarded in Summary Motion:
In Rahman v. Cannon Design Architecture Inc., 2021 ONSC 7624 Justice Dunphy awarded $40,000 for partial indemnity pre Rule 49 offer and an additional $40,000 thereafter the Rule 49 offer on a substantial indemnity basis.
The Court considered the following factors :
1. One should not second guess the strategic litigation choices made by the winner.
2. There was a large amount of money at issue ( $300,000) and a large number of issues.
3. Including a number of issues and parties that had a faint hope of success is not a practice to be encouraged.
Here is the interesting point. The Defendant won the motion thus these costs were awarded against the Plaintiff.
I am advised by Plaintiff counsel that they have filed an appeal on the merits so this part of the case may also be considered by the appeal .
court.
By the way, this was a one day motion. Not bad pay for a days work.
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Another COVID Unionized Workplace Case:
Another 24 Month Notice Period :
BC Court Extends Notice Period Because of COVID and No CERB Reduction:
CERB Deductible for Wrongful Dismissal Damages Says BC SC:
In Yates v. Langley Motor Sport Centre Ltd ( 2021 BCSC 2175) Justice Mayer determined that the reasonable notice period for a 30 year old Marketing Manager and Events Co-ordinator making $60,000 with only 8.5 months service was 5 months.
However he deducted $10,000 of CERB payment from the award for the following reasons:
Deduction of CERB Benefits
[35] The evidence establishes that after her temporary layoff commenced, Ms. Yates obtained CERB from the Government of Canada in the amount of $12,000. Langley Hyundai submits that the portion of these benefits paid during the reasonable notice period determined by this Court should be deducted. It is my understanding that the maximum CERB payable to Ms. Yates per month was $2,000. Accordingly, in my view the amount at issue is $10,000 which is the amount. I conclude Ms. Yates obtained in CERB payments during the five-month notice period I have found she was entitled to
[36] My understanding of the basis of Langley Hyundai’s submission is that it is appropriate to deduct CERB payments as there is no requirement for Ms. Yates to return such benefits and therefore an award against it for payment in lieu of benefits, for the same period that she received CERB benefits, without deduction, would constitute impermissible double recovery.
[37] Langley Hyundai refers to the Government of Canada website which indicates that “[a] severance payment does not impact an individual’s eligibility for the CanadaEmergency Response Benefit”: https://www.canada/ca/en/services/benefits/ei/cerbapplications/ questions.html, at page 3/7. Further, Langley Hyundai submits that under the common law severance pay constitutes damages arising from wrongful dismissal and not employment income. For these reasons they submit that severance pay does not disqualify an individual from receiving, or in this case retaining, CERB payments pursuant to the Canada Emergency Response BenefitAct, S.C. 2020, c. 5, s. 8. That is, in Langley Hyundai’s submission, payment in lieuof notice to Ms. Yates will not result in her having to repay CERB benefits.
[38] Langley Hyundai relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada inIBM Canada Limited v. Waterman, 2013 SCC 70 [IBM], as binding authority on how courts are to approach the question of whether a collateral benefit should bededuced from payment in lieu of notice.
[39] In IBM the Supreme Court considered whether pension benefits received by a dismissed employee should be deducted from damages for wrongful dismissal. The Supreme Court concluded that pension benefits were a type of deferred compensation for the employee’s service and constitute a type of retirement savings and were not intended to be an indemnity for wage loss resulting from unemployment. For these reasons the Supreme Court agreed with the decisions of the courts below that pension benefits were not deductible from an award for wrongful dismissal: IBM, at para. 4.
[40] The Supreme Court stated that a collateral benefit (being a benefit flowing to a plaintiff and connected to the defendant’s breach), would be considered compensating advantage justifying a deduction from a damages award for wrongful dismissal when the advantage is one that (a) would not have accrued to the plaintiff if the breach had not occurred, or (b) was intended to indemnify the plaintiff for the sort of loss resulting from the breach: IBM, at paras. 27-2
[42] I agree with the finding of Justice Gerow in a recent decision of this Court,Hogan v. 1187938 B.C. Ltd., 2021 BCSC 1021 [Hogan], in which Gerow J. stated as follows:
[100] The plaintiff received $14,000 in CERB payments in 2020. The CERB payments raise a compensating advantage issue. If the CERB payments are not deducted the plaintiff would be in a better position that he would have been if there had been no breach of the employment contract.
[101] But for his dismissal, the plaintiff would not have received the benefit. The nature of the benefit is an indemnity for the wage loss caused by the employer’s breach of contract. There is no evidence that the plaintiff contributed to obtain the benefit by paying for it directly or indirectly.
[43] In this case I find that CERB payments would not have been payable to Ms. Yates if she had not been terminated from her employment with Langley Hyundai – which termination constitutes a breach of her employment contract justifying payment in lieu of notice. Further, I find that CERB payments are a benefit intended by the Government of Canada to be an indemnity for the loss of regular salary arising from Langley Hyundai’s breach of Ms. Yates’ employment contract. Unlike an employee funded pension or a private disability insurance policy Ms. Yates did not contribute to the benefit.
[45] Ms. Yates relies upon Jack Cewe Ltd. v. Jorgensen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 812, inwhich the Supreme Court of Canada found that damages for wrongful dismissal are earnings for unemployment insurance purposes, on the basis that such earnings arise out of employment. In that case the Supreme Court found “… the payment of unemployment insurance contributions by the employer was an obligation incurred by reason of respondent’s employment. Therefore, to the extent that the payment of those contributions resulted in the provision of unemployment benefits, these are a consequence of the contract of employment and, consequently, cannot be deducted from damages for wrongful dismissal.” (at p. 813). The same cannot be said with respect to CERB benefits in that the source of these benefits does not originate from contributions made by either Ms. Yates or Langley Hyundai as a result of her employment. Rather, the government funds used to pay CERB are likely from all sources of government revenue
[47] I do not find, on the available evidence, that Ms. Yates’ will be required to repay CERB benefits if she obtains an award of damages for wrongful dismissal. I conclude that CERB benefits of $10,000 which were received by Ms. Yates should be deducted from the award of damages.
My Comments :
This issue keeps on coming up in various trial decisions in different provinces with different outcomes but has not yet been ruled upon by any Court of Appeal .
Following September 2020 and until September 2021 , EI is also no longer repayable from wrongful dismissal damages according to Order 8.
Will the same result flow as with CERB ?
However there is one very important difference between non repayable CERB and non repayable EI. The employee, or that matter the employer, did not contribute to CERB but both parties contribute to EI, therefore the SCC comments in Jack Cewe Ltd. v. Jorgensen will probably result in that the Plaintiff will not have to repay EI but the Defendant will not get credit for these payments in calculating wrongful dismissal damages.
Whoever thinks that employment law is easy is very ill informed.
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As these were all unionized employees , the Court first rules that they would not exercise their discretion to intervene at this point as there was already under may an arbitration process dealing with the same issues .
On the second test of irreparable harm the Court commented as follows:
[35] Second, as Justice Akbarali explained in TTC, the Applicants have mischaracterized the harm at issue. The harm the Applicants may suffer is being placed on unpaid leave, or being terminated from employment, if they remain unvaccinated. They are not being forced to get vaccinated; they are being forced to choose between getting vaccinated and continuing to have an income on the one hand, or remaining unvaccinated and losing their income on the other (TTC at para 50, citing Lachance et al c Procureur général du Québec, November 15, 2021, Court No 500-17-118565-210) at para. 144 [Lachance]). Put simply, a vaccine mandate does not cause irreparable harm because it does not force vaccination.
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